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State Immunity from Federal Regulation-Before
and After Garcia: How Accurate Was the Supreme
Court's Prediction in Garcia v SAMTA that the
Political Process Inherent in Our System of
Federalism Was Capable of Protecting the States
Against Unduly Burdensome Federal Regulation?
I. INTRODUCTION
The authority of Congress to regulate the private sector under
its Commerce Clause' power has long been settled and is not sub-
ject to dispute.2 This comment looks at: (1) the situations where
the federal government has attempted to regulate the states as
states through its Commerce Clause power; (2) the various posi-
tions taken by the United States Supreme Court on this issue; (3)
how the issue stands today in light of the Supreme Court's predic-
tion in Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,'
that the political process was the mechanism by which the states
could protect themselves against unduly burdensome federal regu-
lation; and (4) whether the political process is the proper mecha-
nism to protect the states against unduly burdensome federal
regulation.
1. US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 3. The Commerce Clause states in pertinent part that
Congress shall have power "[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several states, and with the Indian tribes." Id.
2. As early as 1824 in Gibbons v Ogden, 21 US (8 Wheat) 1 (1824), the United
States Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause gives Congress plenary power to reg-
ulate interstate commerce. The court later reaffirmed the power of Congress to regulate very
extensively through the Commerce Clause in National Labor Relations Board v Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 US 1 (1937). In that case, the Court held that Congress had the
power to regulate any activity, even intrastate production if the activity had an appreciable
effect, either direct or indirect, on interstate commerce. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
US at 37. Such extensive authority for Congress to regulate under its Commerce Clause
power was also highlighted in US v Darby, 312 US 100 (1941), where the Supreme Court
stated that Congress has the power to regulate the hours and wages of workers who were
engaged in the production of goods destined for interstate commerce and could prohibit the
shipment in interstate commerce of goods manufactured in violation of such wage and hour
provisions. Darby, 312 US at 123.
3. 469 US 528 (1985).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Maryland v Wirtz" (1968): United States Supreme Court up-
held application of Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local
government schools, hospitals, nursing homes, and transit
employees.
In 1938 Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"). The purpose of the FLSA was to establish a nation-
wide minimum wage and maximum hours standard. Congress
wanted to ensure "the maintenance of the minimum standard of
living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of
workers." 6 In 1966 Congress amended the FLSA by extending its
coverage to various schools, hospitals, nursing homes, and transit
companies of state and local governments.'
In 1968 the extension of the FLSA to state and local government
entities was challenged in the case of Maryland v Wirtz. In Wirtz,
the state of Maryland, "joined by 27 other states and one school
district, brought an action against the Secretary of Labor to enjoin
enforcement of the Act insofar as it appl[ied] to schools and hospi-
tals operated by the states or their subdivisions."8 Specifically, the
state of Maryland contended that the Commerce Clause power did
not permit Congress a constitutional basis for extension of the
FLSA to schools and hospitals operated by the states or their
subdivisions.'
In a 7-2 decision, the Court refused to accept Maryland's argu-
ment that the commerce power must yield, to state sovereignty in
the performance of traditional governmental functions and upheld
the extension of FLSA coverage to state schools and hospitals. Jus-
tice Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated the judiciary "will
not carve up the commerce power to protect enterprises indistin-
guishable in their effect on commerce from private businesses, sim-
ply because those enterprises happen to be run by the states for
4. 392 US 183 (1968).
5. Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 USC §§ 201 et seq (1978 and Supp 1992).
The FLSA requires, inter alia, that a covered, non-exempt employee be paid a statutorily
prescribed minimum wage and an overtime premium of time-and-one-half for' each hour
worked in excess of 40 per week.
6. Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1985 ("FLSAA"), Legislative History,
99th Cong, 1st Sess (1985) reprinted in 2 USCCAN 652.
7. FLSA of -1966, Pub L No 89-601, 80 Stat 830 (1966), codified at 29 USC §
203(S)(1)(B) (1966).
8. Wirtz, 392 US at 187.
9. Id at 193.
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the benefit of their citizens."10 Thus, the Court concluded that the
1966 amendments to the FLSA, which regulated labor conditions
in public schools and hospitals, was constitutional under the Com-
merce Clause.11
B. National League of Cities v Usery" (1976): United States Su-
preme Court expressly overruled Maryland v Wirtz.
In Maryland v Wirtz,13 the Court came as close as it had ever
come to expressly saying that there is no such thing as state immu-
nity from federal regulation. Eight years later, however, in Na-
tional League of Cities v Usery,14 the United States Supreme
Court not only said that there was such a thing as a state regula-
tory immunity, but it actually applied such an immunity and
found an exercise of federal regulation over the states
unconstitutional.
The factual background to National League of Cities was as
follows: in 1974 Congress had expanded the FLSA to cover all state
and local government employees with the exception of a small
number of workers who were specifically exempt.15 As a result, al-
most all state and local government employees were required to be
paid the applicable minimum wage s for each hour worked and
were required to receive time and one-half for each overtime hour
worked.
17
Within two years of enactment of the 1974 amendments to the
FLSA, the validity of its applicability to state and local govern-
ments was again challenged in National League of Cities v
Usery.15 The argument raised by the state and local governments
was that Congress had infringed upon a constitutional prohibition
running in favor of the states as states when it sought to apply the
provisions of the FLSA to employees of state and local
10. Id at 198, 199.
11. Id at 200, 201.
12. 426 US 833 (1976).
13. Cited in note 4.
14. Cited in note 12.
15. FLSAA of 1974, Pub L No 93-259, §§ 6 (a)(1), (6), 88 Stat 58 (1974), currently
codified at 29 USC § 203(S)(1)(C) (1974).
16. 29 USC § 206 is the provision of the FLSA dealing with minimum wage. At the
time of the 1974 amendments to the Act, the minimum wage was $3.35 per hour. 29 USC §
206(a)(1) (1978).
17. 29 USC § 207(a)(1) (1965 and Supp 1992) is the overtime provision of the FLSA.




In a 5-4 decision overruling Wirtz,'20 the Supreme Court agreed
with the state and local governments and held that both the 1966
and the 1974 FLSA amendments were unconstitutional to the ex-
tent they interfered with "integral" or "traditional" governmental
functions of the states or their political subdivisions.21 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that the power to deter-
mine the wages and hours of state and local employees was an un-
doubted attribute of state sovereignty, which application of the
FLSA would significantly alter or displace, thereby improperly in-
terfering with the states' right to structure employer-employee re-
lationships in traditional governmental activities. 22 The Court was
of the opinion that there would be little left of the states' "sepa-
rate and independent existence" if Congress could withdraw from
the states the authority to make such fundamental employment
decisions as how much to pay their employees for carrying out
their governmental functions.23 By asserting FLSA coverage over
state and local governments, the Court held that Congress had at-
tempted to improperly exercise its Commerce Clause power over
the states as sovereign governments, and had used such authority
"in a fashion that would impair the States' ability to function ef-
fectively within a federal system."2 4 The Court further found that
such an exercise of Congressional authority directly displaced the
freedom of the states to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions and, as such, was contrary to
the federal system of government embodied in the Constitution. '
C. Garcia v SAMTA26 (1985): United States Supreme Court ex-
pressly overruled National League of Cities" and upheld applica-
19. National League of Cities, 426 US at 837. The argument was that Congress had
infringed upon the sovereignty of the states by regulating the wages such states must pay
their -employees.
20. Cited in note 4.
21. FLSAA, 2 USCCAN at 653 (cited in note 6).
22. National League of Cities, 426 US at 845, 851. Examples of traditional govern-
mental activities given by the Court included fire prevention, police protection, sanitation,
public health, parks, and recreation. Id.
23. Id at 851.
24. Id at 852.
25. Id.
26. 469 US 528 (1985).
27. Cited in note 18.
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tion of FLSA to state and local governments.
On December 21, 1979, in keeping with the traditional govern-
mental activity versus non-traditional governmental activity dis-
tinction laid down by the Court in National League of Cities,8 the
United States Department of Labor issued its final regulations de-
fining traditional and non-traditional functions of state and local
governments for purposes of determining whether the F.L.S.A.
would be applicable in a given case or not.29 ThDepartment of La-
bor defined mass transit systems as a non-traditional government
function which therefore was subject to the provisions of the
FLSA.3 0 Subsequently, a number of public transit authorities chal-
lenged the Department of Labor's position in Garcia v San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority."1
In, Garcia, the United States Supreme Court listed the prerequi-
sites for governmentail immunity under National League of Cities
as summarized by the Court in Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining.
32
Specifically, the court stated that four conditions had to be satis-
fied before a state activity could be deemed immune from a given
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause:
(1) the federal "statute... must regulate the states as states";
(2) the federal "statute must address matters that are indisputably attrib-
utes of state sovereignty";
(3) state "compliance with the federal obligation must directly impair the
states' ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
mental functions"; and
(4) "the relation of state and federal interests must not be such that the
nature of the federal interest justifies state submission.
'33
The issue in Garcia focused on the third requirement - whether
the challenged federal statute entrenched upon "traditional gov-
ernmental functions. '34 The Court overruled National League of
Cities and upheld application of the FLSA to state and local gov-
ernments. In doing so, the Court rejected as "unsound in princi-
ple" and "unworkable in practice" a rule of state immunity from
federal regulation that turned on a judicial appraisal of whether a
28. Id.
29. FLSAA, 2 USCCAN at 654 (cited in note 6).
30. Id.
31. 469 US 528 (1985).
32. Garcia, 469 US at 537 citing Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining, 452 US 264, 287-
88 (1981).
33. Garcia, 469 US at 537.
34. Id at 538.
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particular governmental function was "integral" or "traditional. 35
The Court stated that it had "no license to employ freestanding
conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring congressional au-
thority under the Commerce Clause. '3 6 In describing the "tradi-
tional governmental function test" as "unsound" and "unwork-
able," the Court held that the procedural safeguards inherent in
the structure of the federal system were better able to protect the
states' sovereign interests than were judicially created limitations
on federal power." That is, the Framers of the federal Constitution
gave the states a role in the selection of both the executive and the
legislative branches of government and that role would best pro-
tect their sovereign interests. 38 According to the Garcia Court:
* . . the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special re-
straints on federal power over the states inhered principally in the working
of the national government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the
objects of federal authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more prop-
erly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the fed-
eral system than by judicially created limitations on federal power.3 9
Thus, according to the Garcia Court, the fundamental limitation
that the constitutional scheme imposes on Congress' Commerce
Clause power to protect the "states as states" is one of process
rather than one of result."0 The Court was clearly of the opinion
that the protection of the states' interest was to come from the
structure of the decision-making process in Congress. This struc-
ture is the "political process"-the idea that Congress is organized
by states, and that the senators and representatives will be mind-
ful of and support their own states.
III. HAS THE POLITICAL PROCESS WORKED TO PROTECT STATE
INTERESTS?
Not long after Garcia was decided, Congress confirmed the effec-
tiveness of the political process in preserving the states' interests.
Less than nine months after the United States Supreme Court up-
held application of the FLSA to state and local governments in
Garcia, Congress enacted the 1985 amendments to the FLSA.
These amendments substantially lessened the Act's impact on
35. Id at 546, 547.
36. Id at 550.
37. Id at 552.
38. Id at 551.
39. Id at 552.
40. Id at 554.
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state and local governments."' Specifically, Congress accomplished
this by providing an overtime exception for states and their subdi-
visions. This exception was codified in 29 USC section 207 (0),
which, subject to certain requirements, basically permits states and
their subdivisions to issue compensatory time off at a rate of one
and one-half hours for each overtime hour worked in lieu of having
to pay for the overtime work in cash.,2 The fact that state and
local governments are permitted to issue compensatory time off in
lieu of cash overtime payments is significant, since this is specifi-
cally prohibited of employers in the private sector."3
As the legislative history to this amendment indicates, "it is es-
sential that the particular needs and circumstances of the states
and their political subdivisions be carefully weighed and fairly ac-
commodated." 4 Since the states occupy a special position in our
constitutional system, Congress has the responsibility of ensuring
federal legislation does not undermine the states' special position
or unduly burden the states.4 5 According to the legislative history,
it is this responsibility, in conjunction with furthering the princi-
ples of cooperative federalism, which Congress was seeking to dis-
charge when it enacted the 1985 amendments to the FLSA in re-
sponse to the Garcia decision. 46 It is clear that these amendments
were enacted to accommodate the concern the states and their po-
litical subdivisions feared that the FLSA would have upon them. 7
It is likewise clear that the Garcia Court's prediction of how the
states would protect themselves in our federal system was quite
accurate in this instance. The political process inherent in our sys-
tem of federalism has indeed proven to be capable of protecting
the states against unduly burdensome federal regulation. Indeed, it
was a relatively quick response, as the Garcia decision was handed
down February 19, 1985, and 29 USC section 207 (0), containing
the overtime exception for state and local governments, was en-
acted on November 13, 1985.
Utilizing the federal political process to preserve the states'
power was not, however, a new discovery or theory upon which the
41. Garcia was decided on February 19, 1985, and the FLSA amendments enacted in
response to Garcia were passed on November 13, 1985. Pub L 99-150, 99 Stat 787 (1985).
42. 29 USC § 207 (o) (1985).
43. 29 USC § 207 (a), 29 CFR § 778 et seq (1990).






Court hit. As the Garcia Court itself noted, states have repeatedly
been successful in using. the federal political process to pursue
their own interests against the federal government, such as in ob-
taining federal grants for state needs, obtaining federal funding for
such services as police and fire protection, education, public health
and hospitals, parks and recreation, and sanitation."8 The states
have also exercised their influence to obtain federal support to ex-
empt themselves from a variety of obligations imposed by Congress
under its Commerce Clause power, such as the Federal Power Act,
the National Labor Relations Act, the Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
the Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act, and the Sher-
man Act, all of which contain express or implied exemptions for
states and their subdivisions."9
Focusing on the FLSA as an illustration, one can see a number
of exceptions and exemptions under the Act which the states had
been successful in carving out for themselves even prior to the
Garcia decision. For example, the 1974 amendments, which ex-
tended coverage of the FLSA to state and local governments, also
contained a limited overtime exception for police officers, firefight-
ers, and related employees.5 ° This exception alleviated the impact
of the FLSA on the fire protection and law enforcement activities
of state and local governments by providing for work periods of up
to twenty-eight days, as opposed to the usual seven day workweek
applicable to most private sector employers, thereby providing a
higher ceiling on the maximum number of hours an employee
could work before a state or local government would be liable for
paying overtime. 1 As the legislative history indicates, this special
exception was established by Congress in recognition of the special
needs of state and local governments in the area of public safety,
and the unusually long hours that public safety employees must
spend on duty.
52
48. Garcia, 469 US at 552-53.
49. Id at 553.
50. 29 USC § 207 (K) (1991 Supp). Other exceptions and exemptions from overtime
for state and local governments under the FLSA include: 29 USC § § 207 (N), 207 T, and 213
(b)(20).
51. FLSAA, 2 USCCAN at 653 (cited in note 6) discussing 29 USC § 207 (K) which




One could conclude, based upon the foregoing case law, that
where Congress attempts to regulate the states as states under its
Commerce Clause power, the political process inherent in our sys-
tem of federalism is capable of protecting the states against unduly
burdensome federal regulation. Historically, the states have aggres-
sively made their positions and needs known to Congress, and, for
the most part, have been accorded the proper respect and defer-
ence due the sovereign states.
Perhaps the larger question one may ask, however, is even if the
political process may work in most instances to protect state inter-
ests, is it the proper mechanism to protect the states? The Garcia
Court indicates that for the states to protect themselves within the
constitutional system they must look to Congress, not to the
courts. This raises serious questions about the role of the Supreme
Court as the balancing mechanism in our federal system. It has
been suggested that the Garcia Court has "abdicated a function
that history, principle, and an understanding of the political pro-
cess strongly argue that the federal judiciary should undertake.
53
As James Madison wrote, "there must be a tribunal empowered to
decide controversies relating to the boundary between the two
jurisdictions. "54
The Garcia Court reasoned that the judiciary was not the proper
vehicle for drawing workable distinctions between what was a
traditional governmental function, thereby entitling the state to
some protection from federal intrusion, and what was not a tradi-
tional governmental function, thereby subjecting the state to fed-
eral regulation.5 Perhaps attempting to distinguish between which
activities are "traditional governmental functions" and which are
not, is "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice," but
does this mean the Court should not attempt to do so and simply
defer to Congress to handle the matter in a fair way as dictated by
the political process? One scholar, speaking to Garcia and the
greater issue, has argued "the separation of powers is not to be
abandoned simply because it may be inconvenient.""
The political process certainly plays an important part in our
53. A.E. Dick Howard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism: On the Need for a
Recurrence to Fundamental Priciples, 19 Ga L Rev 789, 790 (1985).
54. Howard, Garcia, 19 Ga L Rev at 791 (citing James Madison, The Federalist No.
39, 250, 256 (Wesleyan University Press 1961).
55. Garcia, 469 US at 546, 547.
56. Howard, 19 Ga L Rev at 795 (cited in note 53).
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system of federalism. Congress is elected by the citizens of their
respective states, and, may indeed be mindful of and protect the
interests of their constituencies. One must ask, however, if catering
to the interests and needs of the citizens of a given state is the
same as catering to the interests and needs of the states
themselves.
The political process, as a mechanism for protecting the states as
states, was a much stronger argument prior to the enactment of
the Seventeenth Amendment, which altered Article I Section III of
the Constitution by transferring the power to elect the Senate from
the state legislatures to the people of the states. 7 Since the power
to elect is the power to control, one could conclude that perhaps
the states' interest may not always be well-served or best-protected
by the political process inherent in our system of federalism.
It is true in many cases that the political process may indeed
work to protect the states against unduly burdensome federal regu-
lation, as the amendments to the FLSA illustrate. In completely
deferring to Congress and the political process, however, one must
wonder whether "the Garcia majority left an important constitu-
tional sentry post unmanned." 8 Federalism is an intrinsic compo-
nent of our constitutional system, and safeguarding that process
should not be left to the totally unrestrained discretion of the po-
litical branches.5 9 Instead, it is comforting to know that the Court
still serves as a check on Congress, and will step in when such in-
tervention is warranted. 0 One should also bear in mind that Gar-
cia was a 5-4 decision, which a changing Court may well overturn
when presented with the proper case, thereby accepting the re-
sponsibility it shirked in Garcia.
John E. DuMont
57. US Const, Art I § 3, cl 1. In pertinent part, states: "The Senate of the United
States shall be composed of two Senators from each state, chosen by the Legislature thereof.
.Note, how ver, the foregoing was significantly altered by US Const, Amend XVII, cl 1,
which states in pertinent part: The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each state, elected by the people thereof . ..
58. Howard, 19 Ga L Rev at 796 (cited in note 53).
59. Id at 797.
60. Id.
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